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Abstract 
In this paper, we explored the structure and implications of interbank networks in 
pre-war Japan, focusing on director interlocking. It was found that approximately 60% 
of the banks had at least one connection with another bank through director 
interlocking. These connections resulted in the construction of complex networks of 
banks, not to be reduced to core-periphery structures. Based on this finding, the impact 
of the interbank networks on the financial performance and the survivability of banks 
was examined. It was revealed that while a bank with a network was not always more 
profitable compared to a bank without it, a bank which had a network with profitable 
banks was more profitable. Concerning the probability of failure, it was found that a 
bank with a network was less likely to fail than a bank without one. In this case as well, 
the failure probability of a bank was negatively associated with the profitability of the 
connected banks. In addition, interbank networks affected on bank mergers. Namely, a 
bank tended to choose a bank in the same network as a counterpart of the merger, 
which suggests that interbank networks played a role in coordinating bank mergers.       
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1. Introduction 
     Social network analysis has been developing in the fields of sociology and 
mathematics for the last fifty years.  In economics, as well, the number of studies on 
networks have rapidly increased over the last decade.  These studies, mainly use 
game-theoretic models, which investigate how networks are formed when each person 
strategically construct links with others and how stable and efficient such networks are 
(Jackson 2003; Jackson 2006; Goyal 2007).  At the same time, network analysis has 
been applied to understand various economic phenomena, including mutual insurance 
among villagers (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007), informal credit among firms (Macmillan 
and Woodfuff 1999), and welfare participation (Bertland, Luttmer and Mullainathan 
2000).  These studies focus on the effects of networks on economic behaviours and 
outcomes.      
      In  particular,  financial  economists  have been interested in the role of networks in 
interbank markets and financial contagions.  They investigate how a shock to a bank 
contagiously spreads to other banks and how the possibility of a contagion is associated 
with the structure of interbank networks (Allen and Gale 2000; Frexias et al. 2000; 
Leinter 2005).  Allen and Gale (2000) classified the structures of interbank networks 
into two types, namely the complete structure of claims, where each bank is 
symmetrically connected with all other banks, and the incomplete structure of claims, 
where banks are linked only to neighbouring banks.  They theoretically showed that a 
contagion is less likely in the former structure than in the latter.   
Based on Allen and Gale (2000), several studies empirically investigated 
interbank contagions (Sheldom and Maurer 1998; Furine 2003; Upper and Worms 2004; 
Boss et al.2004b).  Furthermore, research on financial networks has been extended to 
studies on the relationship between inter-firm networks and contagions (Boissay 2006), 
as well as to studies on the network topology of the interbank market (Boss et al.2004a;  3
Cajueiro and Tabak 2007; Iori et al.2008).    Boissay (2006) investigated how a financial 
contagion spreads thorough an inter-firm network of trade credit, and showed how 
likely a sound firm is to fall into financial distress when its customers are financially 
distressed, both theoretically and empirically.  The literature on the network topology 
of the interbank market empirically revealed the structure of the inter-bank market, 
mainly using the methodology of statistical physics applied to complex networks.  In 
particular, they focused on the degree distribution of networks, the clustering coefficient 
and other measures to characterize the structure of the networks (e.g. random, small 
w o r l d   a n d   s c a l e - f r e e ) .                  
In addition, there is related literature which focuses on director interlocking, 
especially its implications on corporate  governance.  It  has  been revealed that directors 
with multiple appointments have difficulties in assuring significant control of 
management due to a lack of time or specific knowledge (Ferris et al.2003; Perry and 
Peyer 2005 ect.).  Some sociology literature considers director interlocking a 
communication mechanism, rather than that of control, and argue that director 
interlocking can be a source of information about business practices and strategy 
(Useem1982; Palmer et al.,1993; Mizruchi 1996, etc.).  Based on case studies and 
quantitative analyses, they showed that interlocked executives get useful information 
about business strategy or practice by observing different operations, organizational 
forms or problems faced by other companies, and apply their experience and knowledge 
acquired to their own companies.           
This paper, focuses on interbank networks in Japan before the Second World War.   
The banking sector in pre-war Japan is particularly interesting from the standpoint of 
financial network studies.  In pre-war Japan, there were many large investors who 
held blocks of shares and directorships of multiple banks (Okazaki, Sawada and 
Yokoyama 2005; Okazaki, Sawada and Wang 2007), and as a result, many banks were  4
connected with other banks through director interlocking and ownership to form 
complex interbank networks.  These interbank networks can be comprehensively 
identified, using datasets compiled from company directories.  The Japanese financial 
system became unstable and experienced several financial crises in the 1920s.   
Therefore, by focusing on pre-war Japan, the implications of interbank networks on 
financial systems can be examined in detail.       
        The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 presents the 
characteristics of interbank networks based on director interlocking.  In Section 3, the 
effects of interbank networks on the performance and survivability of banks is 
examined.    Section studies how an interbank network affects the choice of counterpart 
banks in consolidations and how the consolidations based on inter-bank networks differ 
from other consolidations in terms of post-merger performance.  Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Structure and Quality of Networks 
The first task was to identify interbank networks.  For this purpose, director 
interlocking was focused upon, as mentioned in the previous section.  The data source 
is the 1927 issue of the Directory of Banks and Companies (Ginko Kaisha Youroku), 
which was also used in Okazaki et al.(2005)1.  This source covers the names of the 
directors and auditors of the banks and non-banking firms in 1926 whose paid-in capital 
was two hundred thousand yen or more2.  That year was chosen because the market 
structure of the banking industry drastically changed after that, due to the huge wave 
of bank mergers and exits that were caused by the financial crisis and the merger 
                                                  
1  Tokyo Koshinjo, one of the largest private credit bureaus in pre-war Japan, published 
a directory of corporate directors, Ginko Kaisha Youroku, every year from 1897 to 1942. 
2  Conveniently, this source includes a name index.    From this name index, a list of all 
the banks and non-banking companies in which he/she had a director position is listed 
by the person’s name.        5
promotion policy put forth by the government based on the 1927 Bank Law (Okazaki 
and Sawada 2007; Okazaki, Sawada and Wang 2007) 3.  The financial data for each 
bank in 1926 are taken from the 1927 issue of the Yearbook of the Bank Bureau 
(Ginkokyoku Nenpo ) by the Ministry of Finance, which covers all of the banks in Japan 
excluding the colonies.  The number of banks commonly included in these two sources 
is 10074. 
Using the Directory of Banks and Companies, a connection was identified 
between a certain pair of banks, if a person who was a director of a bank was 
concurrently a director of the other bank.  Even if a certain bank (Bank A) had two 
directors who also held director positions in another bank (Bank B) the number of 
connections between Bank A and Bank B are counted as one.  Table 1 presents the 
distribution of the numbers of connections found in each bank.  As shown, 587 banks 
out of 1007 banks (58.3%) had at least one connection with another bank through 
director  interlocking.    
The number of connections in Table 1 corresponds to the “degree” concept found 
in social network analysis literature.  In this literature, the degree, or the number of 
relations a certain unit has with other units, is supposed to be a measure of the 
“centrality” of the former units in the network.  That is, the more relations a unit has 
with other units within a network, the more central or important in the network that 
unit is considered to be (Wasserman and Faust 1994).   
Table 2 summarizes the structure of interbank networks in pre-war Japan. In 
Panel A, 587 banks which had at least one tie are classified by the number of 
                                                  
3  The Bank Law set the minimum capital of the bank, which many banks were unable 
to meet. Those banks were practically obliged to merge with another bank or be 
liquidated. We will discuss this law in Section4, in more detail. 
4  Ginkokyoku Nenpo covers 1,417 ordinary banks in Japan, excluding colonies, at the 
end of 1926. Financial data are completely available for 1,398 of the 1,417 banks. And, 
the data on directors and auditors are available in Ginko Kaisha Youroku for 1,007 
banks.    6
connections.  A bank with four or more connections is defined as a core bank. A bank 
with less than four connections, but linked with a core bank, is defined as a periphery 
bank.  The rest of the banks, with at least one connection, are defined as independent 
network banks.   
Panel A indicates that the core banks and the periphery banks were a smaller 
portion of the banks with networks.    This implies that the structure of the networks in 
the banking industry cannot be characterized through a simple core-periphery 
architecture, or a star-network.   The independent network banks, which are dominant 
in the banks connected to networks, can be classified into two types.  One type is the 
banks indirectly connected to core banks, namely sub-subsidiaries of core banks.  The 
other type is the banks constructing independent small networks, not connected to core 
banks, either directly or indirectly.    As can be seen, interbank networks had a complex 
structure. 
In Panel B, the banks with networks were split into two categories to observe 
the regional characteristics of interbank networks.  On one hand, a bank with an 
“intra-regional network” was one which was connected only with banks operating in the 
same prefecture5.  On the other hand, a bank with an “inter-regional network” is one 
which had at least one connection with a bank operating in a different prefecture.  
From Panel B, it is confirmed that the percentage of intra-regional networks is 
approximately 70%.  It can be said that interbank networks were mainly formed 
within prefectures.  This result may have reflected upon the local characteristics of 
investors and their investment behaviors.   
Next, Table 3 shows the basic statistics of financial performance with respect to 
the banks with networks (Panel A), as well as all the sample banks (Panel B).  
Comparing these panels, it was found that the performance of the banks with networks 
                                                  
5  Here, operating in the same prefecture means that the headquarters of two banks 
were existed in the same prefecture.    7
was not better than the average performance of all the sample banks, while the scale of 
the banks with networks was larger in terms of deposit     
Finally, the quality of the network of each bank was examined.  The quality of 
the network of a bank (Bank A for example), was measured by the average performance 
of the banks with which Bank A was connected.  Figure1 shows the distribution of the 
quality of the networks with respect to the 587 banks, which had at least one connection 
with another bank.  As can be seen,, the variance of the network quality was fairly 
large, in terms of every financial ratio.  In other words, there was substantial 
heterogeneity in the quality of networks.   This fact is significant when considering the 
implications of the interbank networks.  For instance, a bank which was connected 
with the banks performing well, might enjoy management skill transfer and relief 
during an emergency, whereas a bank which was connected with the banks performing 
badly might receive a negative impact from them.  This issue is explored in the next 
section.    
 
3. Network and Bank Performance 
3.1 The Effects of Networks on Profitability and Survivability   
      As revealed in the previous section, there were many interbank networks 
through director interlocking in 1926.  This section will investigate how those 
interbank networks affected bank performance, specifically profitability and 
survivability.  There are a number of papers on the financial performance of banks 
(Smirlock, 1985; Bourke, 1989; Berger, 1995, Goddard et al. 2001, 2004, etc.)  In the 
context of pre-war Japan, Okazaki et al. (2005) investigated the determinants of bank 
profitability, focusing on loan quality, economies of scale, extent of market competition 
and the risk taking attitude.  Meanwhile, Okazaki et al. (2007) and Okazaki (2007) 
investigated the determinants and implications of bank exits in pre-war Japan.  Here,  8
their approach is principally followed, adding the variables capturing the interbank 
network.6  
     The  empirical  specifications  are  as follows.    These two equations are estimated 
using the cross-section data of year 1926. 
 
    ROEi =α0 +α1*NETWORKi +  α2*EQi  ＋α3*MARKETi +α4*SECURITYi 
+α5*SIZE i＋α5*LEVERAGE i＋α6*BOJ i +εi                       ( 1 )  
    P r ( F A I L i =1)=F(β0 +β1*NETWORKi+β2*EQi  + β3*SIZE I ＋β4*BOJ i )      (2) 
 
                                                   
 
ROEi, the dependent variable of Equation (1) denotes the return on equity (ROE) of 
bank i.  FAILi in Equation (2) denotes a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a bank 
exited due to a failure in the period from 1927 to 1931, and 0, otherwise.  As 
explanatory variables, NETWORKi is included to capture the effect of the interbank 
network.  NETWORKi is the dummy variable which is equal to 1, if bank i had at least 
one connection with another bank, and 0, otherwise.   
The interbank network may affect the performance of a bank in several ways. 
For one thing, a bank which has connections with other banks may be able to share 
information and useful knowledge, and thereby enhances its profitability and 
survivability (Useem (1982); Carpenter and Westphal (2001), etc.).  For another, a 
bank with a network may receive relief loans during emergencies from the connected 
banks7.  If these are the cases, the expected sign of the coefficient of NETWORK is 
                                                  
6  Since Okazaki et al. (2005), especially focus on the effects of the connections between 
banks and non-banking companies, variables related with those connections in the 
estimated model are included.    In this paper, the model is altered by replacing it with 
the variable to capture the effect of interbank networks.     
        
7  Imuta (1980) cite the history of Shikoku-Ginko and point out the possibility that 
banks belonged to large networks enjoyed efficient asset portfolio since they expected 
that they could receive relief loans during a state of emergency from banks in the same 
n e t w o r k s .         9
positive in Equation (1), and negative in Equation (2).   
      A bunch of control variables are included in Equations (1) and (2).  EQ is a 
variable to control for the effect of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923.  Many banks 
in the south Kanto district (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures), 
suffered from bad loan problems due to the destruction of collateral by the earthquake.  
EQ is the dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the headquarters of a bank was located 
in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, or Saitama prefecture, and 0 otherwise. It is expected that 
the banks operating in these areas would be less profitable and have a higher 
probability failure rate.  MARKET denotes the market share of the top three banks in 
a prefecture, in terms of the number of operating units, i.e. the headquarters and the 
branches, in the prefecture8.  
SECURITY is the variable to capture the asset quality of a bank, measured by 
the ratio of security holdings to loans.  The preceding studies on the banking industry 
in pre-war Japan have regarded securities as relatively safe assets with low risk and 
low return, because most of them were composed of government bonds and the 
debentures of major companies (Okazaki et al. 2005, 2007; Nanjo and Kasuya 2005).  
As they assumed, under normal economic conditions, the expected return of bank loans 
is higher than that of securities, but the relation can be reversed in a depression, 
because a portion of bank loans are uncollectible.    As a serious depression continued, in 
Japan in the 1920s, it was quite possible that the ROE of the bank whose portfolio was 
mainly composed of securities would be higher than that of the bank whose portfolio 
was mainly composed of loans.    In this case, the coefficient of SECURITY is expected to 
be negative in Equation (2). 
SIZE, which is defined as the log of total assets, is the variable to capture the 
                                                  
8  This variable is common for all of the banks in the same prefecture.    Since the data 
on the amount of deposits or loans of individual banks by prefecture is not available, the 
number of branch offices was used as a marker share.          10
economies of scale in Equation (1).  If there were economies of scale in the banking 
industry, the coefficient of SIZE would be positive.  In addition to saving the unit cost, 
it is easier for large banks to diversify assets.  Hence, the coefficient of SIZE in 
Equation (2) is expected to be negative. 
      The variable BOJ is the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a bank had a 
transaction relationship with the Bank of Japan, and 0, otherwise.  Okazaki (2007), 
which investigated the role of the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) in pre-war Japan, 
revealed that a bank with a transaction relationship with the BOJ enjoyed higher 
profitability because the transaction relationship loosened the constraint on the asset 
portfolio, and that the transaction relationship with the BOJ lowered the probability of 
failures for solvent banks.    Therefore, the variable BOJ is included to capture the effect 
of LLR in both of the equations.           
     LEVERAGE is the ratio of capital to deposits.  This variable is included to 
control for the effect of the capital structure, following Modigliani and Miller’s 
propositionⅡ.  According to the proposition, the expected return on equity increases 
along with financial leverage.  As for Equation (2), several other financial ratios are 
added.  Namely return on equity (ROE) is included, the ratio of capital to deposits 
(CAPDEPO), and the ratio of bank deposit reserves to total assets (LIQUID), following 
Okazaki et al. (2007) and Okazaki (2007)9.  
Equation (1) is estimated by the Tobit model, because the profit data of 
individual banks from Ginkokyoku Nenpo were censored at zero.  Table 4 presents 
estimation results of Equation (1).  In column 1, the coefficient of NETWORK is 
                                                  
9  These variables were chosen to capture the components of the CAMEL rating, which 
has become a standard guideline for the risk of bank failure (Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000).    CAPDEPO was used to the capture capital adequacy of a bank.    Low value for 
this variable indicates high risk.    LIQUID was the variable for liquidity of assets.    If a 
bank has sufficient liquid assets, it is likely to survive against the abrupt withdrawal of 
deposits.    As ROE indicates bank profitability, it can be clearly predicted that ROE will 
have a negative impact on the probability of bank failures.  11
positive, but not statistically significant, implying that the benefit of the interbank 
network on the profitability is not clearly confirmed by this specification.  In columns 
2-4, the structure and quality of the network are taken into account.   To test the effect 
of the structure of the network, the banks with networks were split by the position in 
the networks, in Column 2.   In column 2, the variable NETWORK is split into three 
dummy variables, CORE, PERIPHERY and INDEPENDENT, which denote the core 
banks, the periphery banks and the independent network banks, respectively in the 
sense of Panel A of Table 2.  The coefficients of these three variables are positive, but 
not statistically significant.  In other words, the structure of the network did not have 
a significant effect on bank profitability10.  
The effect of the quality of the network on bank profitability is now examined.  
It is hypothesized that a bank which had connections with the banks performing well 
would have higher profitability than otherwise.    To capture the quality of the network, 
the interaction terms are included.  NETWORK*CONROE  and 
NETWORK*CONCAPDEPO, where CONROE and CONCAPDEPO denote the 
weighted average of the return on equity and the ratio of capital to deposits of the 
connected banks, respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 report the estimation results.  In 
column 3, while the coefficient on NETWORK is no longer positive, the coefficient of 
NETWORK*CONROE is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis.  In column 4, the coefficient of NETWORK*CONCAPDEPO is also 
positive, although not statistically significant.  In summary, it can be concluded that 
what mattered was not a network itself but its quality. 
     Next, Equation (2) is estimated by the Logit model.  Table 5 reports the 
                                                  
10To examine the effect of the regional characteristics of an interbank network, 
additional estimations were conducted where NETWORK is split into two variables: 
INTRAREGION and INTERREGION which denote the banks with intraregional 
networks and ones with interregional networks, respectively in the sense of Panel B of 
Table 2.    Although not reported in the table, it is confirmed that both of the two 
network variables are not statistically significant.  12
estimation results.   As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on NETWORK is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that banks with 
networks were less likely to fail than those without networks.    As for other explanatory 
variables, the coefficients of SIZE, EQ and ROE are statistically significant and have 
the expected signs.   
In Columns 3-5, the effect of the structure and quality of interbank networks are 
examined, as in Equation (1).  In column 3, NETWORK is replaced by CORE, 
PERIPHERY and INDEPENDENT.  Column 3 shows that the coefficients of these 
three variables are negative and statistically significant only for INDEPENDENT, 
which implies that the benefit of the network was observed outside the core-periphery 
structure.    However, the magnitude of the point estimator is not substantially different 
among these three variables11.  
       With respect to the quality of the network, column 4 shows that the coefficient 
of NETWORK*CONROE is negative and statistically  significant.  This  means  that  the 
effect of the network to prevent a bank failure depended upon the profitability of the 
banks in the network12.  It can be concluded again that in enhancing the survivability 
of a bank, what mattered was not the network itself but its quality.    Finally, in column 
5, the coefficient of NETWORK*CONCAPDEPO is negative but was not statistically 
significant.  
   
                                                  
11  To examine the effect of geographical feature of networks, an additional estimation 
was conducted, where NETWORK was replaced by INTRA-REGION and 
INTER-REGION.    It is confirmed that both of the coefficients are negative and 
statistically  significant.  Also,  the  magnitudes of these point estimators are almost the 
same.    Hence, with respect to the effect of interbank networks on the bank 
survivability, the geographic structure of the networks did not matter. 
12  Column 5 in Table 5 implies that if there were many banks with negative profits in 
the network, that network would increase the probability of failure.    Because the profit 
data of banks are censored at zero in the dataset, it is difficult to directly check this 
possibility.    However, while the ratio of the banks whose profit data are censored is 
4.9% in the banks with networks, it is 8.3% in the banks without networks.    Therefore, 
it is unlikely that interbank networks increased the  probability  of  bank  failures.            13
  3.2 Bank Networks and Contagious Withdrawal of Deposits 
      The effect of the interbank network may not always be positive.  As many 
studies have pointed out, it is possible that financial contagions spread through 
interbank networks.  For instance, when a certain bank is closed due to a bank run, 
the banks connected with it are more likely to be exposed to contagious runs.  This is 
because depositors suspect that the connected bank become insolvent and illiquid due to 
default of the interbank loans to the closed banks 13.  In this way, contagious 
withdrawals of deposits may spread within the same network.  Thus, this kind of 
contagious deposit withdrawals was investigated to determine if this actually occurred 
in pre-war Japan or not.    For this purpose, the following equation on the determinants 
of deposit growth of each bank is estimated. 
 
GDEPOi =γ0 +γ1*NETWORKi +  γ2* NETWORKi * CONGDEPOi +γ5*SIZE i 
+γ5*M&A i + ui                                                  ( 3 )  
 
,where the dependent variable, GDEPO is the deposit growth rate from the end of 1926 
to the end of 1927.  This period includes the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, where 
nationwide bank runs occurred, and consequently 44 banks were closed.  As for 
explanatory variables, the interaction term NTEWORK*CONDEPO is to capture the 
contagious effect of the deposit shock of the banks in the same network.  Here, 
CONDEPO indicates the average deposit growth of the banks in the same network.   If 
deposits of a bank decreased due to withdrawals of deposits of the banks in the same 
network, the coefficient on NETWORKi * CONGDEPOi would be positive.  In the 
estimation, both the arithmetic and weighted average of the deposit growth rate of the 
                                                  
13  In the origin of Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, the bank run against Tokyo 
Watanabe bank immediately triggered the other run against its family bank, Akaji 
Saving bank. Consequently, these two banks were closed.    14
connected banks were used in calculating CONGDEPO of e a c h  b a n k .   M & A  i s  t h e  
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a bank experienced mergers or acquisitions in 
1927.    With respect to the banks which experienced mergers or acquisitions in 1927, in 
calculating GDEPO, the deposits of the pro-forma banks are used for the end of 1926.14 
In addition, the financial ratios which were used in Equation (2) as the explanatory 
variables were included.    As for sample observations, 183 banks from the 1007 samples 
were lost in the previous analyses, due to exits of banks.  In addition, eight outlier 
observations were excluded whose deposit growth rate exceeded 100%.  Consequently, 
816 observations remain. 
      Table 6 reports the estimation results.  Columns 1-3 are the cases including 
prefecture dummies, while columns 4-6 are the cases excluding them.  As indicated in 
columns 1-3, the coefficients of NETWOK are negative but not statistically significant. 
In columns 2 and 3, both of the coefficients of NETWORK*CORGDEPO are positive but 
not statistically significant.  Thus strong evidence can not be found for contagious 
withdrawal of deposits within the network.  Then, the prefecture dummies in columns 
4-6 are excluded, taking into account the possibility that the prefecture dummies 
capture the contagious effect of the networks.  However, as shown in columns 5 and 6, 
both of the coefficients of NETWORK*CONGDEPO are still statistically insignificant, 
although the magnitudes become slightly larger.    Furthermore, to correct the selection 
bias due to bank exits, Equation (3) is re-estimated with a sample selection model by the 
maximum likelihood (ML) method, where the selection equation consists of the 
variables explaining the probability of exit.  The estimated results are shown in the 
Appendix.  It can also be confirmed that the coefficients on NETWORK*CONGDEPO 
are positive but not statistically significant.  In summary, there is no strong evidence 
for the contagious effect of interbank networks.  The coefficients on ROE and 
                                                  
14  The value of a pro-forma bank indicates the sum of the balance sheet in participating 
banks.    With respect to other variables, the values of acquiring banks are used.  15
CAPDEPO are positive and statistically significant, which implies that banks 
performing well were more likely to collect deposits.  In other words, the fundamental 
factors explain the change of deposits better than contagious factors, which is consistent 
with Yabushita and Inoue (1993) and Okazaki (2007), which analyzed the factors 
affecting the probability of bank closures during the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 to 
reject contagious bank closures.   
  
4. Bank Networks and Consolidation 
      As mentioned above, a wave of bank consolidations occurred in the late 1920s and 
the early 1930s due to the Bank Law of 1927.  This law prescribed that a bank should 
have capital not less than one million yen in principle, and that an existing bank whose 
capital was smaller than this minimum criterion was required to meet this requirement 
within five years.  While more than half of the ordinary banks did not meet this 
criterion when the law was enacted in 1928, each of them was principally not allowed to 
increase their capital by itself.  Therefore, these banks were obliged to choose 
consolidations or liquidations.  The question, then, is how interbank networks were 
related to the process and result of these consolidations. These questions are addressed 
in this section. 
 
4.1    Bank Networks and Choice of Partner Banks 
        First, the effects of interbank networks on the process of consolidations are 
examined.    Most of the banks whose capital was smaller than the criterion searched for 
consolidation counterparts.  How did these banks choose the counterparts?   And 
what role did interbank networks play in the process?  It is possible that interbank 
networks affected the choice of counterparts.  For instance, a bank may not be sure 
about the soundness of another bank with which it is supposed to be merged, because it  16
is difficult for the bank to have complete information on the counterpart.   In this case, 
the interbank network based on director interlocking may mitigate such asymmetric 
information between the two banks.   Also, the common directors may coordinate 
negotiations on the consolidation15.  Therefore, it is expected that banks were more 
likely to be consolidated with the banks in the same network than those outside the 
network.  
            For the testing of this hypothesis, the events of bank consolidations that occurred 
in the period from Jan. 1927 to Dec. 1932 were used, as reported in Ginko Jiko Geppo 
(Monthly Bank Affairs) edited by the Bank of Japan.  Out of the consolidation events 
reported in the source, the consolidations were selected where the information on the 
directors is available with respect to all the participating banks.  Consequently, 173 
events remain.  Table 7 shows the number and ratio of the intra-network 
consolidations, where the participating banks had connected with each other before the 
consolidation, out of 173 consolidation samples.  In cases when the number of 
participating banks was more than two, it was regarded a consolidation as an 
intra-network if there had been at least one connection among the participants.  In 
Panel A, consolidations are classified into three categories according to Ginko Jiko 
Geppo, namely, absorption, acquisition and combination into a new bank.  Here, 
combination into a new bank refers to the form of consolidation where a new bank was 
established after all of the participants were dissolved.     
      It is confirmed that in more than 30% of the consolidations, networks had already 
existed among the participating banks.  This result suggests that interbank networks 
played a role in the process of consolidations.  Observing the different types of 
consolidations, it was found that the proportion of intra-network consolidations was 
                                                  
15  In D’aveni and Kesner (1993), it is shown that target firms are less likely to resist 
takeover when their managers and the bidder’s firm outsiders shared connections to the 
same prestigious networks.        17
approximately twice as high in the combination into a new bank as in the other 
combination categories.    In addition, Panel B indicates that this proportion is higher in 
a “more-than- two consolidation” than in a “one-to one consolidation”.   
      In  interpreting  the  above  findings,  Kin’yu Kenkyu-Kai (1934), is a basic reference 
on bank consolidations in Japan in this period.  According to this reference, the 
participant banks tended to choose to combine into a new bank when the powers of 
them were almost balanced.  On the other hand, in general, negotiations of 
consolidations are supposed to be more likely to break off, when many equal-power 
participants are involved.    Taking these points into account, it can be interpreted from 
the results in Table 7 that interbank networks facilitated coordination among merger 
participants, in particular when the negotiation costs were high.   
Panel C classifies consolidations into intraregional consolidations and 
interregional consolidations. Here, while the former refers to the consolidations where 
all of the participating banks operated in the same prefecture, the latter refers to other 
consolidations.  Panel C shows that the ratio of intra-network consolidations is higher 
in the intraregional consolidations than in the interregional ones.   
            Concerning the results in Panel B, it is possible that the participating banks were 
more likely to have connections among them in case of a combination into a new bank 
simply because the number of participants was larger.  Also, concerning the results in 
Panel C, the ratio of intra-network consolidations is higher in case of intraregional 
consolidations simply because the density of networks was higher within the same 
prefecture.  
Thus, it is necessary to examine the role of the interbank network in choosing 
merger partners econometrically.    Tests were made on whether a connection between a 
pair of banks had an effect to enhance the probability of consolidation between them, 
using the data of 320 banks, which participated in 173 consolidations.  The  equation  to  18
be estimated is as follows.   
 
Pr(MERGEij=1) =F(β0+β1NETWORKij+β2PREFECTUREij＋εij), i≠j      (3) 
 
, where MERGEij is the dummy variable which is equal to 1, if bank i and bank j were 
merged in the period from 1927 to 1929, and 0, otherwise.   NETWORKij is the dummy 
variable which is equal to 1, if there was a director interlocking between bank i and 
bank j, and 0, otherwise.  If a network between the two banks made it easier for them 
to be merged, the coefficient of NETWORKij is expected to be positive. PREFECTUREij 
is the dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the headquarters of bank i and bank j were 
located in the same prefecture, and 0, otherwise.  Equation (3) is estimated with 
respect to all the pairs of banks, using the Logit model16.    
      The estimation results are reported in Table 8.  In column 1, where all of the 
consolidation samples are used, the coefficient of NETWORK is positive and 
statistically significant, which suggests that each bank tended to choose the bank with 
which it had already had a connection, in selecting a merger counterpart.  In columns 
2-4, the consolidations are classified into abortions, acquisitions and combinations into 
a new bank, respectively.  While the coefficient of NETWORK is positive and 
statistically significant in all cases, its magnitude is relatively larger for combinations 
into new banks, which is consistent with the results in Panel B of Table 7.  Hence, it 
can be concluded that interbank networks facilitated coordination among merger 
participants, in particular when the negotiation costs were high. 
In Panel B, consolidations are classified into intraregional and interregional 
consolidations.  Here,  PREFECTUREij is excluded from the explanatory variables.    It 
is confirmed that the coefficient of NETWORK is positive and statistically significant in 
                                                  
16  Total number of pairs of i bank and j bank is N*(N-1)/2 since removing the pairs of 
the same bank.    Therefore, it amounts to 51040 pairs in the case for 320 banks.          19
both of intraregional and interregional consolidations.  However, the magnitude of the 
former is larger than that of latter, which is also consistent with the result of Panel C of 
Table 7.   
    In summary, it can be safely said that interbank networks affected the choice of 
merger counterparts, especially in the cases of combinations  into  new  banks.              
  
4.2 Bank Networks and Post-merger Performance 
      It has been confirmed that the interbank networks facilitated consolidations 
within them.    How, then, were the interbank networks associated with the result of the 
consolidations?  To be more specific, did the intra-network consolidations provide a 
better effect on bank performance than the other consolidations?    It is possible that the 
pre-merger networks reduced the costs for unifying different organizations.  To 
investigate this point, the effects of intra-network consolidation on post-merger 
financial performance were estimated.  In the analysis, Okazaki and Sawada (2007) 
was principally followed, which examined the effect of consolidation promoted by the 
1927 Bank Law on the financial performance of banks, using data on the event of 
1927-32.  There, the effects of consolidation were examined on the bank performance 
by comparing the change in ROA and deposit growth rate from year T-1 to year T+2 and 
T+3, between the consolidated banks and the non-consolidated banks, where T is the 
event year when the consolidation occurred17.  In the following analysis, the events of 
consolidations in 1927-29 were focused upon. 
    To begin with, the events of the consolidations need to be selected.  In order to 
identify the consolidation effects clearly, the banks which participated in multiple 
consolidations in the time-period from beginning of year T-1 to the end of year T+318 
                                                  
17  Furthermore, to capture the effect of policy-promoted consolidation, they split the 
effect of consolidations into that of policy-promoted ones and strategic ones. 
18  For exception, in the case that one bank merged other banks twice within one year,  20
were excluded.  In addition, thc fouus was  limited to the consolidation events where 
the director interlocking data was available for all of the participating banks.    Thus, 66 
consolidation events remain.  Next, the control samples for each event year (1927-29) 
are chosen to be compared with the consolidated banks. The control sample banks, 
which correspond to the consolidated banks in the event year T, refer to the banks which 
were not involved in any consolidations in the period from the beginning of year T-1 to 
the end of year T+3.  For example, the control samples of the event year 1927 are the 
banks which were not involved in any consolidations during the time-frame from 
1926-30.    These are compared with the banks which were consolidated in 1927.    Event 
observations for the year 1927 were the consolidated banks in 1927 and their control 
sample banks.  In the same way, event observations were constructed for the years 
1928 and 1929, to have unbalanced panel data in three groups of event years 1927-29, 
which consisted of 1075 bank-event year observations.  Table 9 shows the number of 
consolidations and control samples by event year.  The consolidations are classified 
into intra-network consolidations and other consolidations.  Approximately 30% of the 
consolidations are classified into intra-network consolidations, where the participating 
banks had a mutual connection.   
As to the empirical specification, the model of Okazaki and Sawada (2007) was 
slightly modified to explicitly capture the effects of intra-network consolidations.  The 
model to be estimated is as follows. 
         
  ⊿Yit =β0+β1NTCONSit+β2OTHERCONSit+γXit+εi t             (4) 
 
 
,where i indexes the bank, while t indexes the event year group.  The dependent 
                                                                                                                                                  
These consolidations are dealt with as if they were merged at once.    Included are four 
such cases in sample events: Dai-Hachiju-go Bank (1927), Ju-ni Bank (1928), 
Ogaki-Kyoritsu Bank (1928) and Goju-roku Bank (1928).            21
variable,⊿Yit is the difference of ROA or deposit growth rate in the period from the end 
of year T-2 to the end of year T+2 or T+319.    For the value of consolidated banks in year 
T-2, pro-forma banks were used, which means this is the sum of the balance sheets of 
the banks which participated in the consolidations.  NTCONS is the dummy variable 
which is equal to 1, if a bank participated in an intra-network consolidation in year T.   
OTHERCONS is the dummy variable which is equal to 1, if a bank participated in the 
consolidations where the participants had no previous connection with each other. If the 
consolidation had a positive effect on the bank performance, the coefficients of NTCON 
and OTHERCON are expected to be positive.  In particular, of interest are the 
differences between the coefficients of NTCONS and OTHERCONS.   X is a vector of 
other explanatory variables.    Following Okazaki and Sawada (2007), the natural log of 
the total assets (LN(ASSET) is included, the change in the number of branch offices (⊿
BRANCH), and the dummy variable indicating whether the headquarters of the bank 
was located in an urban area, namely Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo 
prefectures (URBAN)20.    In addition, the loan-asset ratio (LOAN/ASSET) is included in 
case the dependent variable is the change of ROA, because this variable is expected to 
capture the asset risk of banks.  Equation (4) is estimated, using pooled OLS with a 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard error (White 1980).   
Table 10 reports the estimation results in the case of the deposit growth rate is 
used as the dependent variable.  While in Columns 1-4, all of the sample banks were 
used, in Columns 5-8, the outliers were removed whose deposit growth rate exceeded 
100%.    In Columns 1 and 2, the deposit growth rate from the end of year T-2 to the end 
                                                  
19  Since consolidations were frequently accompanied by asset reevaluation, the value of 
the assets of the post-consolidation bank was adjusted in the following way. 
3 2 1 , ),i ASSET (ASSET ASSET ASSET T i T T
*
i T = − + = + − +  
20  Moreover, in actual estimation, the event year dummies are included in explanatory 
variables to control for the shocks common to the samples of the same event year group, 
although the estimated results are not shown in the table.         
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of year T+2 is used as the dependent variable, and in Columns 3 and 4, the deposit 
growth rate from the end of year T-2 to the end of year T+3 is used. Column 1 shows the 
case where there is difference distinguished between intra-network consolidations and 
other consolidations.  The coefficient of the consolidation dummy is positive and 
statistically significant.  This suggests that consolidations had an effect on enhancing 
the banks’ ability to collect deposits, which is consistent with Okazaki and 
Sawada( 2007).  In Column 2, there is a difference distinguished between 
intra-network consolidations and other consolidations.  It is confirmed that the 
coefficients of both NTCONS and OTHERCONS are positive and statistically 
significant, and the magnitudes of these coefficients are almost the same.    In Column 4, 
what is reported are the results concerning the deposit changes from T-2 to T+3, both 
coefficients are still positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude of NTCONS 
is larger than that of OTHERCONS.  Even if the outliers are excluded, the results are 
qualitatively the same (Columns 5-8).  In summary, both of the intra-network 
consolidations and other consolidations had a positive effect on deposit growth, and as 
time went on after the consolidations, the positive effect of the intra-network 
consolidations seemed to become larger than that of the other consolidations.    However, 
due to the constraints of data, it is difficult to confirm the long-run effect of 
intra-network consolidations21.     
          Finally, Table 11 reports the estimation results of Equation (4), with the change of 
ROA as the dependent variable.    Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the performance 
changes from the end of year T-2 to year T+2, and Columns 3 and 4 show those from the 
end of year T-2 to year T+3.  In Columns 1 and 3, the coefficient of the consolidation 
dummy is negative, but not statistically significant.  In Columns 2 and 4, both of the 
coefficients on NTCONS and OTHERCONS are negative, but are also not statistically 
                                                  
21  If the interval is longer, many consolidation samples may be lost.  23
significant.  While the magnitude of the coefficient of NTCONS is smaller than that of 
OTHERCONS in Column 2, the result is reversed in Column 4.  Therefore, clear 
evidence can not be confirmed that intra-network consolidations had a better effect on 
bank profitability than other consolidations.   
In Columns 5-8, Equation (4) was estimated with the change of ROA as the 
dependent variable, taking into account the fact that the profit data are censored at zero.   
Eliminating the banks whose profit data were zero, Equation (4) is estimated, using the 
sample selection model with the maximum likelihood method.  During selection of the 
equation, a consolidation dummy was included, SIZE, URBAN, LOAN/ASSET and 
event year dummies, which are expected to explain the cross sectional differences of 
bank profit, following Okazaki and Sawada (2007), although the estimated results of 
the selection of the equation are not shown in Table 11.  The estimation results of the 
second stage are reported in Columns 5-8.  It is confirmed that the negative effect of 
consolidations became slightly smaller, but qualitatively identical.   
        Summarizing  the  results  obtained  in this section, it is concluded that interbank 
networks made within-network consolidations easier, by reducing the costs of 
coordination.   There is no strong evidence concerning the effects on post-merger 
p e r f o r m a n c e .      
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
       In this paper, the structure and implications of interbank networks in pre-war 
Japan were explored, focusing on director interlocking.  It was found that 
approximately 60% of the banks had at least one connection with another bank through 
director  interlocking.  These connections resulted in the construction of complex 
networks of banks, not to be reduced to core-periphery structures.     
Based on this finding, the impact of the interbank networks on the financial  24
performance and the survivability of banks was examined.  It was revealed that while 
a bank with a network was not always more profitable compared to a bank without it, a 
bank which had a network with profitable banks was more profitable.    In other words, 
concerning profitability, what mattered was not a network per se but the quality of 
network.  Concerning the probability of failure, it was found that a bank with a 
network was less likely to fail than a bank without one.  However, the quality of 
networks mattered also in this case.  That is, the failure probability of a bank was 
negatively associated with the profitability of the connected banks.     
  These results suggest that inter-bank networks contributed to bank performance 
and the stability of financial system in some way.  However, strong evidence that a 
financial contagion spread through inter-bank networks as stated in literature on 
financial networks (Allen and Gale 2000; Frexias et al. 2000; Leinter 2005) could not be 
found.  
      In addition, the effect of interbank networks on the bank consolidations which 
surged in the 1920s and 1930s were examined.  It was found that a bank tended to 
choose a bank in the same network as a counterpart of the consolidation, which 
suggests that interbank networks played a role in coordinating bank mergers.   The 
post-merger performances were not significantly different between a merger of the 
banks in the same network and that of a bank in different networks.  However, in the 
sense that bank mergers provided a positive impact on deposits, and that interbank 
networks played a role in coordinating bank mergers, interbank networks contributed 
to stabilizing the financial system, which was faced with crisis in the 1920s.   
      This paper has explored the role of interbank networks from different angles 
than those points of view found in preceding financial network literature.  It was 
revealed that human networks among banks indeed affected the financial performance 
and conduct of the banks.  However, the exact details of the sources for those effects  25
could not be disclosed.  Exploring this issue still remains an opportunity for future 
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 Table1 Distribution of the number of connections through director interlocking













13 1 0.10%Table2　Structure of interbank networks
Panel A  Positions in networks
Types OBS %
Core bank 81 8.04%
Periphery bank  142 14.10%
Independent network bank 364 36.15%
Without networks 420 41.71%
Total 1007 100.00%
Panel B Regional characteristics of interbank network.
Types OBS %
Intra-regional network 402 39.92%
Inter-regional network 185 18.37%
Without networks 420 41.71%
Total 1007 100.00%Table3 Basic Statistics
PanelA  Basic statistic on banks with networks
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of connections 587 2.068 1.659 1.000 13.000
Capitals/Deposits 587 0.898 4.370 0.036 101.377
Deposits/Loans 587 0.896 0.667 0.003 10.382
Reserves/Total assets 587 0.088 0.081 0.000 0.646
ROE 587 0.135 0.079 0.000 0.732
Amount of deposits (thousand yen) 587 11904.8 46882.6 1.9 609252.4
PanelB  Basic statistic on all sample banks
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capitals/Deposits 1007 1.043 7.060 0.036 195.1
Deposits/Loans 1007 1.142 7.973 0.003 253.1
Reserves/Total assets 1007 0.089 0.077 0.000 0.6
ROE 1007 0.133 0.079 0.000 0.7
Amount of deposits (thousand yen) 1007 8696.8 38707.7 1.6 609252.4Table4 Interbank networks and profitability
Dependent variable: ROE
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]












SIZE -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0021
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
EQ -0.0318 a -0.0326 a -0.0317 a -0.0316 a
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083)
MARKET 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
SECURITY 0.0154 0.0151 0.015 0.0155
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0107)
LEVARAGE 0.0071 a 0.0072 a 0.007 a 0.0072 a
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
BOJ 0.0046 0.0047 0.0041 0.0047
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
INTERCEPT 0.1372 a 0.1365 a 0.1349 a 0.1362 a
(0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0363)
Log likelihood 956.10339 957.04466 958.7375 956.2405
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007
Censored 64 64 64 64
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".
The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Table5 Interbank networks and survivability
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
NETWORK -0.5553 a -0.6393 a 0.4872 -0.6311 a











SIZE -0.499 a -0.2192 c -0.2138 c -0.2446 b -0.2239 c
(0.1205) (0.1147) (0.1193) (0.1131) (0.1147)
EQ 1.3276 a 1.0532 a 1.0551 a 1.0401 a 0.9919 a
(0.2382) (0.2949) (0.301) (0.2935) (0.29)
BOJ 0.4037 0.2692 0.2683 0.3679 0.2732
(0.3288) (0.3495) (0.3499) (0.3572) (0.3515)
CAPDEPO 0.0849 0.0843 0.0885 0.0992 c
(0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0572) (0.0533)
LIQUID -4.8702 -4.8862 -2.3722 -2.5879
(3.4352) (3.4359) (2.519) (2.7194)
ROE -13.7681 a -13.7998 a -13.9059 a -14.2562 a
(3.4132) (3.4191) (3.3345) (3.3723)
SECURITY -0.299 -0.3088 -0.2047 -0.284
(0.6893) (0.6973) (0.5357) (0.7373)
INTERCEPT 5.023 a 2.8812 c 2.8097 c 3.05 c 2.8278 c
(1.682) (1.5767) (1.643) (1.5722) (1.5916)
Pseudo 0.0914 0.223 0.2232 0.2334 0.2169
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
NETWORK*CONROE
NETWORK*CONCAPDEP
OTable6 Interbank networks and contagious withdrawal of deposits
Dependent variable: Deposit Growth Rate
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NETWORK -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0034 0.0143 0.0141 0.014





M&A 0.0243 0.0249 0.025 0.0494 b 0.0504 b 0.0504 b
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226)
SIZE -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0114 -0.0116 -0.0117 c
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071)
ROE 0.2389 c 0.2385 c 0.2381 c 0.3257 a 0.3236 b 0.3232 b
(0.1243) (0.1244) (0.1244) (0.1251) (0.1252) (0.1252)
CAPDEPO 0.0011 a 0.0011 a 0.0011 a 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
LIQUID -0.101 -0.1005 -0.1003 -0.1715 -0.1698 -0.1697
(0.1222) (0.1226) (0.1227) (0.1178) (0.1182) (0.1183)
INTERCEPT -0.1691 -0.1666 -0.1656 0.0715 0.0743 0.0748
(0.1234) (0.1235) (0.1235) (0.1056) (0.1056) (0.1056)
Prefecture dummies YES YES YES ＮＯ ＮＯ ＮＯ
R-squared 0.1401 0.1403 0.1405 0.0226 0.0234 0.0237
Observations 816 816 816 816 816 816
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".




(mean)Table7 Interbank networks and bank consolidation in 1927-29
Panel A:  Form of consolidation
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
Absorptions 94 27 28.7%
Mergers of equals 25 14 56.0%
Acquisitions 54 14 25.9%
Total 173 55 31.8%
.
Panel B: Number of participants
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
One-to-one 154 42 27.3%
More than two 19 13 68.4%
Total 173 55 31.8%
.
Panel C: Regional characteristics
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
Intra-regional 146 49 33.6%
Inter-regional 27 6 22.2%
Total 173 55 31.8%Table8 Interbank networks and choice of partner banks
PanelA: Type of Consolidations
All consolidations Absorptions Acquisitions Mergers of equals
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
NETWORK 2.8182 a 1.9435 a 2.0943 a 2.6483 a
(0.2166) (0.2504) (0.3449) (0.2959)
Prefecture 5.0278 a 5.0553 a 4.254 a 6.236 a
(0.2012) (0.2773) (0.3375) (0.7302)
INTERCEPT -7.3869 a -8.0405 a -8.2492 a -10.1263 a
(0.1797) (0.25) (0.2774) (0.7071)
Pseudo 0.4685 0.3978 0.2995 0.483




NETWORK 5.5352 a 4.447 a
(0.188) (0.4622)





Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Table9 Number of samples by event year 






consolidationsTable10 The effect of consolidations on deposit growth rate
All samples Excluding outliers
Dependent variable: Deposit growth rate from T-2 to T+2 or  T+3
Window [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3]
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Consolidation dummy 0.1309 a 0.1019 b 0.1558 a 0.1399 a
(0.0396) (0.044) (0.0388) (0.0434)
NTCONS 0.129 c 0.1374 c 0.1649 b 0.1933 b
(0.0664) (0.0809) (0.0718) (0.0865)
OTHERCONS 0.1317 a 0.0863 c 0.1518 a 0.1169 b
(0.0456) (0.0477) (0.0439) (0.0466)
SIZE -0.0241 -0.0242 -0.0105 -0.0103 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.012 0.0123
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0099)
URBAN -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0245 -0.0244 -0.0499 b -0.0499 b -0.0566 b -0.0565b
(0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.025) (0.025)
⊿BRANCH 0.0299 a 0.0299 a 0.0339 a 0.034 a 0.0431 a 0.0432 a 0.0466 a 0.0469 a
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0063)
d28 -0.0375 -0.0375 -0.039 -0.0391 -0.1041 a -0.1041 a -0.1037 a -0.1039 a
(0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0266) (0.0266)
d29 -0.1473 a -0.1473 a -0.0893 b -0.0893 b -0.158 a -0.158 a -0.104 a -0.1041 a
(0.0309) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0273) (0.0273)
INTERCEPT 0.3714 0.3715 0.0811 0.0779 0.0421 0.0414 -0.2553 c -0.2597 c
(0.2443) (0.2445) (0.2571) (0.2575) (0.1427) (0.1425) (0.146) (0.146)
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075 1053 1053 1055 1055
R2 0.0395 0.0395 0.0341 0.0342 0.0832 0.0833 0.0837 0.0843
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". 
         The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Table11 The effect of consolidations on ROA
OLS Selection model
Dependent variable Dependent variable: Change of ROA from T-2 to T+2 or  T+3
Window [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Consolidation dummy -0.0035 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0008
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.0033)
NTCONS -0.0015 -0.0037 -0.001 -0.0019
(0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0062)
OTHERCONS -0.0043 -0.002 -0.0041 -0.0004
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.0032)
SIZE 0.0015 c 0.0015 c 0.0018 c 0.0017 c 0.0018 c 0.0018 c 0.0017 c 0.0017 c
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001)
URBAN 0.0037 0.0037 0.0041 0.0041 0.0059 b 0.0059 b 0.0065 a 0.0065 a
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)
⊿BRANCH 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Ｌｏａｎ/assets -0.0193 c -0.0193 c -0.0252 b -0.0251 b -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0099 -0.0098
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0118) (0.0118)
d28 -0.0037 c -0.0037 c -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0024 -0.0024
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025)
d29 -0.004 b -0.0041 b -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)
INTERCEPT -0.0217 -0.0217 -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0302 c -0.0302 c -0.0283 -0.0283
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.019)
pho  -0.6082 -0.6087 -0.6336 -0.6334
P-value 0.002 a 0.002 a 0.0013 a 0.0013 a
Censored 181 181 231 231
Observations 894 894 844 844 894 894 844 844
R2/log likelihood  0.0318 0.032 0.0382 0.0382 1561.071 1561.158 1318.468 1318.484
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". 
         The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Appendix Table  Interbank networks and contagious withdrawal of deposits (Sample Selection Model)
Dependent variable: Deposit Growth Rate
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NETWORK -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0119 0.0117 0.0117





M&A 0.0243 0.0249 0.025 0.0437 c 0.0447 b 0.0447 b
(0.0242) (0.02429 (0.0242) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225)
SIZE -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0087 -0.0089 -0.0089
(0.0073) (0.00739 (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072)
ROE 0.2393 b 0.2389 b 0.2386 b 0.3084 b 0.3068 b 0.3064 b
(0.1199) (0.1198) (0.1198) (0.1304) (0.1297) (0.1297)
CAPDEPO 0.001 b 0.001 b 0.001 b 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.00049 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
LIQUID -0.1114 -0.111 -0.1108 -0.0978 -0.0966 -0.0965
(0.1179) (0.1181) (0.1181) (0.1266) (0.1248) (0.1248)
INTERCEPT -0.1704 -0.168 -0.167 0.0697 0.0725 0.0731
(0.11989 (0.1197) (0.1198) (0.1086) (0.1071) (0.1071)
Prefecture dummies YES YES YES ＮＯ ＮＯ ＮＯ
rho  0.120864 0.121521 0.1217022 -0.5962634 -0.5939938 -0.5939471
p-value 0.5205 0.5175 0.5188 0.0013 a 0.0013 a 0.0013 a
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
Censored 191 191 191 191 191 191
Notes:
The table reports the results of the second stage in sample selection model.
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".




(mean)Figure1 Quality of interbank networks
Note: These figures indicate distributions on the quality of networks with respect to the 587 banks, which had at
least one connection with another bank. The quality of the network of a bank (Bank A for example) is measured by
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